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This study identifies consumer welfare from new brand introductions in the potato chip 
market. Price and variety effects of new brand introduction are measured by estimating a 
demand system underlying an expenditure function. Variety effects are positive in most 
cities, while price effects are generally negative when consumers exhibit some variety pref-
erence. Variety effects dominate price effects in most cities; an opposite effect observed in 
some cities may indicate high entry barriers or joint brand- and price-based marketing 
strategies. Results indicate that consumers and producers gain from product innovations, but 
substantial regional variation exists in the distributional effects of new brand introduction. 
 





New brand introduction alters the nature of competition in a market and has important 
consequences for producer and consumer welfare (Bresnahan and Gordon, 1997; Hausman 
and Leonard, 2002; Petrin, 2002). Both demand- and supply-side causes and consequences of 
such introductions have been explored by several researchers, including Bresnahan and 
Gordon (1997), Koehn (2001), Bronfer and Chintagunta (2004), and Pofahl and Richards 
(2009). Given that demand-side explanations often invoke Dixit-Stiglitz or variety-seeking 
preferences—i.e., consumers prefer small quantities of multiple varieties over a large quantity 
of any single variety—the impact of an additional variety should therefore be reflected in 
consumer surplus (a variety effect).
1 
  The extent to which an existing brand’s price is affected by the introduction of a new brand 
(a price effect) is a function of the degree of substitutability between the existing and new 
brands and the form of market competition. The price effect can benefit or harm consumers, 
depending on manufacturers’ market participation in the pre- and post-introduction periods. 
For instance, if the manufacturer of the new brand does not have brands in the given market, 
the new brand will typically lead to lower prices for all competing brands. In contrast, a new 
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1 On the supply side, a firm uses brand or variety introduction to attract new consumers and improve its market share. However, 
a firm’s introduction strategy depends on the extent of sunk costs, which may include fixed production and/or marketing costs of 
each brand or variety (Richards and Hamilton, 2006). Because firms’ strategies and pricing are viewed as exogenous to consumer 
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brand introduced by a manufacturer already serving the given market in a Nash-Bertrand 
(price-competition) setting can lead to higher prices among existing brands (Hausman and 
Leonard, 2002). Hence, the net effect of new brand introduction on consumer welfare can be 
positive or negative depending on the relative strength of the variety and price effects. 
  This study assesses the influence of brand introduction and accompanying changes in 
consumer welfare in geographically separated markets. We draw on Hausman and Leonard’s 
(2002) compensating-variation approach to investigate price and variety effects of new brand 
introductions in regional markets for potato chips, a market with substantial brand-based 
competition. Consumer expenditure on potato chips is evaluated before and after a new brand 
introduction, holding utility constant at the post-introduction level. In addition, the total 
benefit to consumers, expressed in terms of the compensating variation (expenditure change), 
is separated into variety and price effects. For this purpose, we estimate brand demand 
functions, underlying an expenditure function, with pre- and post-introduction data (Pofahl 
and Richards, 2009). The estimates of demand functions are then employed to directly 
measure expenditures and compensating variation. In doing so, we avoid instabilities in 
Hausman and Leonard’s formula approach to deriving consumer welfare from new brand 
introductions. Our focus on consumer welfare abstains from modeling producer behavior for 
two reasons: (a) the form of competition at the retail or manufacturing level remains a subject 
of debate, and (b) the data necessary to understanding producers’ welfare changes are 
proprietary or unavailable (Bronnenberg, Dhar, and Dube, 2009; Dube, 2004; Nevo, 2000; 
Bresnahan and Gordon, 1997).
2 
  Our application focuses on the potato chip market, which has faced significant brand-based 
competition with the introduction of baked, organic, and flavored potato chips. The empirical 
analysis uses the ACNielsen Homescan database, from which potato chip purchases of nearly 
7,000 U.S. households are tracked between 1998 and 2006. Household data on chip price and 
quantity purchased by brands or varieties are aggregated to weekly data for 10 major U.S. 
cities for this analysis.
3 Because of a disclosure issue, we cannot identify brands by name at 
either the regional or national levels. While the disclosure issue somewhat limits us in 
reporting brand-specific results, spatial differences highlighted in the study have implications 
for the heterogeneous effects of national policies (e.g., antitrust regulations). 
 
Research Methods 
Using a dual approach, Hausman and Leonard (2002) define compensating variation as the 
difference in consumer expenditure on the chosen product before and after the introduction of 
a new brand: 
(1) 
10 * 0 (, , ,) (, () , ,) , bn bnb CV E U E U  PPr PPP r  
where CV is the compensating variation, or the expenditure (E) adjustment required to ensure 
utility remains constant after a price change (Just, Hueth, and Schmitz, 2004);
  01 and bb PP
 are
                                                 
2 Because our data and empirical analysis relate to households, our focus is restricted to consumer welfare. Data on producer 
costs and supply-chain linkages are not readily available for an analysis of producer welfare. However, the price effects of new 
brand introductions can provide some insights into producer welfare. 
3 See Pofahl and Richards (2009) for an application to shelf-stable juice products at the national level. Unlike the referenced 
study, we focus on 10 regional markets and use retail purchase data to identify price, variety, and net effects of brand introduction 
on consumer welfare. Moreover, our chosen product’s bulky nature and possible damage from transportation create a unique 
market structure (one national firm versus regional firms), making our application a contribution in the spatial dimension to this 
emerging literature on brand competition. 80   April 2011  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
the price (vector) of existing brands consumed before and after introduction of the new brand; 
Pn is the price of the new brand after introduction; and *
n P  is the “virtual” or inferred price of 
the new brand prior to introduction. Hausman and Leonard define the virtual price as the price 
high enough to ensure zero demand for the new brand (also referred to as “choke price”). 
Prices of other closely related products, r, are also generally included in equation (1), where 
U represents the post-introduction utility level. 
  Consumers can benefit from either price or variety effect following new brand introduc-
tion. The price effect (PE) refers to the possible decline in prices (and thus expenditures) 
when new brands increase competition among all brands, while the variety effect (VE) is the 
gain in utility (or expenditure savings) from an increase in the number of varieties available in 
a given market. Hausman and Leonard show that the total change in expenditure in equation 
(1), holding utility constant, can be separated into two parts, which are attributable to price 
and variety effects: 
(2)  11 1 *
11 00 * *
(,, ,) (, () , ,)
(, () , ,) (, () , ,) ,
bn bnb
bnb bnb
CV E U E U
EU E U
   
  
PPr PPP r
PPP r PPP r
 
where the terms in the first and second square brackets denote, respectively, the variety and price 
effect. The first expenditure function in the variety effect of equation (2),
1 (,, ,) , bn E U PPr is 
actual expenditure in the post-introduction period when all prices are observed. The second 
term,
11 * (, () , ,) , bnb E U PPP r  represents what expenditures would be if new brand consumption 
were to be zero in the post-introduction period, holding utility constant. In order to compute 
such expenditures, virtual prices of the new brands must be high enough to ensure zero 
consumption of new brands. Given such high virtual prices, the reallocation of demand to 
existing brands leads to higher expenditures than the actual expenditures with observed 
prices. Hence, the negative of the first term is the variety effect (−VE) or the consumer welfare 
gain as a result of new brand availability, holding the price of existing brands and utility 
constant at the post-introduction level. 
  The term in the second square brackets of equation (2) represents price effect, the differ- 
ence in consumer expenditures due to price change of existing brands after new brand 
introduction. New brand prices are set at respective virtual prices in both price effect terms, 
which forces their consumption to zero. Hence, the difference in the two expenditures must 
arise from a price effect (the influence of new brands on prices of existing brands), which can 
be either positive or negative. If the new brand competes closely with brands of other manu-
facturers, the price effect will be negative and consumer welfare gain will be equal to −PE. 
Thus, equation (2) can be rewritten as CV = −(VE + PE). 
 
The Demand System 
To measure both price and variety effects, we estimate an almost ideal demand system (AIDS) 
model.
4 Such AIDS models are compatible with either perfectly or imperfectly competitive 
                                                 
4 Hausman and Leonard (2002, p. 254, equation 11) rely on an approximating formula, which requires parameters from an upper- 
and lower-stage demand model. The upper-stage model is used to estimate demand for the product (bath tissue), while the lower-
stage model is an LA/AIDS system to estimate demand for the specific brands of the product. A problem with the approximating 
formula is that it depends on the income elasticity obtained in the upper-stage model. For income elasticities around 0.5 or 0.6, 
Hausman and Leonard’s approximating formula is stable. However, for income elasticities between 0.9 and 1.1, which are entirely 
reasonable for most food products, the approximating formula is unstable and remains undefined for unitary income elasticity 
(Klonaris and Hallam, 2003). Arnade, Gopinath, and Pick  Do Consumers Benefit from New Brand Introductions?   81 
 
suppliers or producers and usually specify shares of various goods in a household’s total 
expenditure as functions of prices, total expenditure, and other control variables. In addition, 
the AIDS model assumes two-stage budgeting, where the total expenditure on each food 
group (e.g., potato chips, cheese) is determined in the first stage (Deaton and Muellbauer, 
1980; Just, Hueth, and Schmitz, 2004). The second stage of the consumer problem determines 
allocation of budget among the available brands or choices within each food group. We 
model up to eight brands of potato chips for each of the 10 major U.S. cities in our sample 
using weekly data. The typical share equation of an AIDS model is expressed as: 
(3) 
1
ln( ) ln( / ) ,
n
it i ij jt i t t it
j
Sa P E P I

         
where Sit represents the expenditure share of the ith brand of potato chips at time t, Pjt is the 
price of the jth brand of potato chips at time t, and βij is the corresponding coefficient repre-
senting the influence of the jth brand price on the purchase of the ith brand. The term ln(Et) 
represents aggregate expenditures on potato chips, PIt represents a price index, and εit is an 
error term (Asche and Wessels, 1997). Symmetry and homogeneity conditions are imposed 
by setting 
  and 0. ij ji ij
j
      
We impose adding-up, which implies that 
  0, 0, and 1. ij i i
ii i
a       
Specifically, one share equation is dropped from the system to avoid singularity, but the 
dropped equation’s parameters are recovered using the symmetry, homogeneity, and adding-
up conditions. The possible endogeneity of Pjt and Et in equation (3) is addressed later. 
  A common problem while estimating micro-level demand functions is that shares and the 
underlying consumption can be zero for certain brands and periods. These observations 
cannot be dropped from estimation because a sample selection bias would arise in the 
estimated demand coefficients (Heien and Wessels, 1990). Including the zero-consumption 
observations implies we must fill in the corresponding prices. Alternative methods are 
available to compute prices when consumption is zero, but we follow Perali and Chavas 
(2000) in setting the highest observed price in our sample as the price when observed 
consumption is zero. Since a higher price implies lower quantity demanded, the highest 
observed price in the sample becomes a proxy for the price that forces consumption to zero. 
  Shonkwiler and Yen’s (1999) two-step procedure is used to estimate the demand system in 
equation (3). For this purpose, we first estimate probit models for any brand for which 
consumption is sometimes observed to be zero. The probit model for purchase decisions (zero 
or one) includes prices, expenditures, and the square of expenditures as explanatory variables 
(Shonkwiler and Yen, 1999; Perali and Chavas, 2000; Arnade and Gopinath, 2006). Then, the 
independent variables in equation (3) are transformed using cumulative densities (expected 
probabilities) at each data point for each equation from the probit estimation. For example, 
the expected probabilities from the probit model for existing brand I is used to transform the 
independent variables of the share equation for existing brand 1. Moreover, the inverse Mills 
ratio from the respective probit model is used as an explanatory variable in the transformed 





Once the system of share equations is estimated, the key step in evaluating the effect of new 
brand introductions on consumer welfare is the derivation of virtual prices.
5 As shown in 
equations (1) and (2), two sets of virtual prices,
  1 0 ** () a n d() , nb nb PP PP
 are necessary to evaluate 
change in consumer expenditures (compensating variation), which is then attributed to price 
and variety effects. The first option to compute virtual prices is the Hausman and Leonard 
(2002) approach, which solves the estimated demand equations to obtain virtual prices. Given 
estimates of the share equation for the ith brand, we can solve for the price of the same brand 
by inverting equation (3). That is, for observations where consumption is zero (Sit = 0): 
(4) 
1
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it P is the virtual price for the ith brand at time t, and a caret (^) over a parameter denotes 
its estimated value. The virtual prices in equation (4) can be sorted for each pre- and post-
introduction time period to obtain
  1 0 ** () a n d () nb nb PP PP
 for evaluating compensating variation 
in equation (2). 
  We found that this approach can generate estimates with large variance and some prices 
can be over four or five times the observed new brand price in the post-introduction period. 
Hence, we also consider using estimated elasticities to project virtual prices as an alternative 
to the Hausman and Leonard (2002) approach. For example, if the own-price elasticity of 
demand for a new brand is −2 (−0.5), then increasing prices by 50% (200%) will force quantity 
demanded to zero, all else constant. The latter approach assumes that demand slopes do not 
change as they approach the price axis. 
 
Expenditures with Virtual Prices 
 
We employ an elasticity approach with the estimated AIDS model to evaluate expenditures at 
pre- and post-introduction observed and virtual prices while holding utility constant at the 
post-introduction level. A key advantage to this approach is that it does not require estimating 
any parameters of the expenditure function which are not contained in the system of demand 
equations.
6 Moreover, the elasticity approach allows us to employ consumer variety prefer-
ence or the Dixit and Stiglitz utility specification similar to Krugman (1980) and Ardelean 
(2009). In our approach, we employ the variety-loving preferences as follows:   
                                                 
5 The derivation of virtual prices, or the choke prices, does not imply that prices are endogenous in our consumer demand model, 
nor does it mean that this paper attempts to explain firms’ pricing behavior. Virtual prices are a hypothetical level of price that 
choke off demand. How those prices might be arrived at is extraneous to this paper (Nevo, 2000). 
6 All but two parameters of the expenditure function can be recovered from any well-specified LA/AIDS model (Deaton and 
Muellbauer, 1980). We attempted to recover the remaining two parameters of the expenditure function by regressing the difference 
between actual expenditures and that component of the expenditure function recovered from the LA/AIDS model on remaining 
variables in the AIDS expenditure function. In doing so, we regressed the difference on a constant and aggregate Q (to represent 
utility) raised to a power determined by the observed price vector. However, these resulting coefficients are highly unstable to 
specification changes and create large variation in the computation of price and variety effects. Hence, we chose the elasticity 
approach to evaluate expenditures. Arnade, Gopinath, and Pick  Do Consumers Benefit from New Brand Introductions?   83 
 
,
a Uq n    
where n is the number of brands consumed and a is the love-of-variety parameter. Setting a to 
zero yields the standard specification of utility in expenditure function estimation. When a > 0, 
consumers prefer varieties. An empirical estimate of a in the neighborhood of 0.4 can be 
found in Ardelean and Lugovskyy (2010) and Ardelean (2009). 
 We  assume  a = 0 in evaluating expenditures with virtual prices in the post-introduction 
period; i.e.,
11 * (, () , ,) bnb E U PPP r [a similar procedure applies for expenditures with virtual prices 
in the pre-introduction period,
00 * ( , ( ), , )]. bnb E U PPP r  
 
■ S TEP 1. We use estimated AIDS model parameters to calculate own- and cross-price 
elasticities for existing brands at the data mean. 
■ S TEP 2. We use average quantities after introduction to calculate a base level of utility, 
i.e.,
  , ii Uq 
 where  i q
 is the ith brand’s average quantity over the sample period. 
■ S TEP 3. We compute the change in new brand prices required to force new brand 
demand to zero, i.e., percentage change between post-introduction virtual and observed 
(average) prices of new brands. With more than one new brand, note that the percentage 
change in new brand prices is a vector. In every existing-brand demand equation, we 
introduce the new brand price (vector of
 ) changes. While these higher prices for new 
brands force their demand to near zero, they also generate changes in quantity demanded 
of existing brands by way of cross-price elasticities. 
■ S TEP 4. We compare utility using the generated quantities from Step 3 with those in 
Step 2. To hold utility constant in the post-introduction period, i.e., between Steps 2 
and 3, a radial expansion (contraction) of the generated quantity mix in existing-brand 
space is applied to move utility up (down). 
■ S TEP 5. Holding utility constant (Step 4), we multiply the generated quantities of existing 
  brands by observed prices in the post-introduction period, yielding
11 * (,() , ,) . bn b E U PPP r  
 
The above steps assume the love-of-variety parameter is equal to zero. We compare the base 
evaluation, a = 0, to two alternative values of a (0.25 and 0.50). 
 
Data and Industry Setting 
Recent and long-term trends make the potato chip market an interesting case for analyzing 
consumer welfare changes arising from new brand introductions (Lin et al., 2001). Brand-
based and regional competition have been critical features of the potato chip market for many 
years (see Wolburg, 2005, for a case study of Double-Cola, a regional brand). This competition 
developed during a decline in the number of plants producing potato chips in the 1960s [U.S. 
Department of Agriculture/National Agricultural Statistics Service (USDA/NASS), 2007]. An 
average of six to seven plants have exited the industry annually between 1960 and 2006, but 
potato chip production increased from 20 to 67 million cwt over the same period (a growth 
rate of 2.6% per year). Only one company appears to have a national presence with multiple 
brand offerings, but it faces significant competition from regional brands, some of which are 
expanding into neighboring regions.   84   April 2011  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
  Against this backdrop, firms have introduced new brands to compete with one another or, 
in several instances, to increase demand for their own existing brands. An increased variety of 
chip products, such as ridged, low-salt, organic, and baked chips, have been introduced into 
the market in the last few decades. Regional variation in demand is significant, with a larger 
share of southern households consuming potato chips (38%), while only 20% of households 
in other regions consume potato chips. Potato chips produced in the United States are largely 
consumed within the country. Exports accounted for only 7% of supply ($172 million) in 2007, 
with major destinations of Canada and Mexico. Imports accounted for only 3% of domestic 
consumption ($81 million). Per capita consumption of potato chips has risen to 19.3 pounds 
in 2006, from a low of about 15 pounds in 1998 [USDA/Economic Research Service (ERS), 
2008]. We chose the potato chip industry for an analysis of welfare changes from new brand 
introductions because of the consolidation of the industry, increases in per capita consump-
tion, the rapid rate of introductions of new brands and varieties, and the domestic focus of the 
market. Potato chips are also a product with a long history of frequent product introduction. 
This setting is amenable to the analysis of consumer reaction to brand introductions. 
  Our source of household data, which have only become available for economic analysis in 
recent years, is the ACNielsen Homescan database. Given regional variations in demand 
and data availability, we chose 10 major U.S. cities for an analysis covering the period 
1998 to 2006—Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York urban, New York suburban, 
Philadelphia, Phoenix, San Antonio (including Austin), and San Francisco (including 
Sacramento).
7 
  Household data on purchases of bagged potato chips were aggregated into weekly observa-
tions for each city, representing 467 weeks beginning in January of 1998 and ending in 2006.
8 
The city-level data are the sum of individual households’ expenditures and quantities for each 
brand. The unit price of a brand is the ratio of the corresponding city-level expenditures and 
quantities. Over the sample period, there is turnover of households participating in the 
ACNielsen Homescan surveys; e.g., a Boston household in 1999 moved to San Francisco in 
2002. In aggregating data to the city level, care was taken to account for households that 
continued to participate when moving to another sample city. Less than 3% of the sampled 
households moved from one city to another. Continuing with the example, if a household 
located in Boston during 1999 moved to San Francisco in 2002, it was included in the 1999 
data for Boston and the 2002 data for San Francisco, but not in both cities and both years. 
  City-specific weekly price and consumption data series were constructed using our sample 
data for four “top” existing brands and a minimum of two “new” brands of potato chips.
9 A 
final category, fifth for existing and third or fourth for the new brands, was used to represent 
all other existing and new brands, respectively. Top brands were chosen by their average 
market share, measured as a proportion of total purchases over our sample period. Most cities 
had the same top existing brands, with a few exceptions. For example, two of San Francisco’s 
four top brands were different than those in other cities. Existing brands were included if they
                                                 
7 Cities such as Seattle, Denver, Washington, DC, and others are not considered because of the small sample size obtained from 
the ACNielsen Homescan database. 
8 The ACNielsen Homescan database consists of some observations where expenditures are recorded as zero or reported prices 
are several times the mean price of the city. We deleted these observations, which represented approximately 0.5% of the sample 
data. 
9 In the cases of Boston, Chicago, New York (urban), New York (suburban), and San Antonio, we had three top new brands and 
the “other” new-brand category. San Francisco had only two new brand introductions during the entire sample period. The remainder 
of the cities had two top new brands and one “other” category. Arnade, Gopinath, and Pick  Do Consumers Benefit from New Brand Introductions?   85 
 
had an average market share of at least 2% over the entire sample period. This cut-off was 
necessary because of the proportion of nonzero observations generally required to estimate a 
censored demand system. 
  New brands were defined as brands purchased during 2002 and 2006 that had not been 
observed being sold in the initial year (1998) of the database. Most new brands appear to have 
been introduced after 2000.
10 Again, top new brands were chosen by their average market 
share over 2002–2006. As with the existing brands, our choice for the number of new brands 
depended on the proportion of nonzero observations available for estimating a censored 
demand system. 
  Table 1 presents the number of households in our total sample and average shares of 
existing and new brands in the pre- and post-introduction periods, 1998–2002 and 2002–
2006. The cumulative number of households ranges from 48 (Boston) to 1,567 (Los Angeles), 
with a total of 7,042 households across 10 major U.S. cities.
11 The share of the top brand 
(index I) ranges from 30.9% in Los Angeles to 8.0% in Philadelphia. In 22 of the 40 
instances, top brands realized lower market shares in the post-introduction period in com-
parison to the pre-introduction period. Moreover, new brands have accounted for 1.9% 
(Philadelphia) to 9.0% (San Francisco) market share across the 10 cities in our sample during 
the post-introduction period. 
 
Estimation and Results 
 
The city-specific AIDS models consisted of share equations for four top existing brands, an 
aggregate of other existing brands, two or three top new brands, and an aggregate of other 
new brands (dropped equation). In the estimation of the share equations using the ITSUR 
procedure, we first test for the presence of heteroskedasticity and first-order autocorrelation 
of εit in equation (3). The Gleser test failed to reject the null of homoskedasticity in almost all 
the estimated equations. Statistical evidence of first-order autocorrelation was found in less 
than 15% of the estimated equations. We therefore proceed to estimate equation (3) after 
addressing the possibility that prices (Pjt) or expenditure (Et) may be simultaneously deter-
mined with brand demand for potato chips. 
  To test simultaneity between Pjt and Sit in equation (3), Geroski and likelihood-ratio tests 
are used. The null hypothesis of E(Pjt, εit) = 0 is not rejected in all cities except Boston. The 
instruments used to estimate the price equations are lagged brand price and quantity (and 
quantity squared), raw potato price, and a retail food price index. In the case of Boston, our 
instrumental equations produced a poor fit (R
2 is about 0.10). While instrumental-variable 
and other procedures are readily available for estimating equation (3), our sample does not 
appear to have the price endogeneity issues observed in other studies (Di Giacomo, 2008; 
Bonfrer and Chintagunta, 2004; Nair, Dube, and Chintagunta, 2005; Nevo, 2000).
12 The lack 
of price endogeneity issues in our sample can be related to the advantages of using aggregate 
versus consumer data in the estimation of censored or discrete choice demand systems (Berry, 
Levinshon, and Pakes, 1998; Petrin, 2002). Such comparisons show that consumer welfare 
                                                 
10 Our analysis is not sensitive to the process of choosing new brands. For instance, altering the cut-off period for the choice of 
new brand yielded very little deviation from the current sample. 
11 Data on all households are not available for all 467 weeks. 
12 Many of these studies model the supply side and assume a degree of mark-up when considering price endogeneity. As noted in 
the introduction, we abstain from modeling the supply side since the form of competition in the potato chip market is unclear and 
data on production costs are unavailable. 86   April 2011  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
Table 1. Top Existing and New Brands’ Average Share of Purchases in Pre- and Post-
Introduction Periods (1998–2002 and 2002–2006) 
  No. of 
Households 
  Top Existing Brands 
City   I II  III  IV  Other 
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estimates from new product introductions are lower but more precise when using consumer-
based data. It is likely that our use of household data to derive city-level demand aided in 
minimizing some of the misspecification biases arising from price endogeneity. 
  Our search for instruments to test whether or not expenditures (Et) are simultaneously 
determined with brand demand was limited by data availability. Weekly data on household 
income, total consumption, or food expenditures are not available at the state or city levels. 
The ACNielsen database has over 6,000 food products, and the aggregation of food expendi-
tures on a weekly basis would be tedious and beyond the scope of this study. Furthermore, 
income data in the ACNielsen database are grouped (e.g., between $25,000 and $35,000); 
weekly interpolation of income data will yield an independent variable with little variation. 
Given the above constraints, we simply replaced Et with Et−1 to lower any bias arising from 
the possible endogeneity of expenditures in our demand system (LaFrance, 1991). 
  Table 2 reports the own-price elasticities of brand demand for all brands in each of the 10 
cities (cross-price and expenditure elasticities are available from the authors upon request). 
All own-price elasticities are negative except for new brand III in Chicago and brand II in 
urban New York. Moreover, about 60% of the own-price elasticities are in the −1.5 to −0.9 
range, suggesting highly elastic demand and high substitutability among brands. Not surpris-
ingly, some of the largest own-price elasticities are observed in the case of new brands (e.g., 
Boston new brand II). Nonetheless, significant differences in own-price elasticities across 
cities highlight the need to account for regional variation in consumer welfare arising from 
new brand introductions.   Arnade, Gopinath, and Pick  Do Consumers Benefit from New Brand Introductions?   87 
 
 
Table 1. Extended  
  No. of 
Households 
  New Brands 
City   I II  III  Other
  






































































































Table 2. Own-Price Elasticities of Brand Demand 
  Top Existing Brands  New Brands 
 City   I   II   III   IV  Other   I   II   III  Other 
 Atlanta  −0.996  −1.680  −1.194  −0.662  −0.678  −0.885  −1.480     —  −0.544 
 Boston  −0.540  −0.720  −0.550  −0.810  −0.510  −1.390  −2.640  −2.090  −1.210 
 Chicago  −1.372  −1.277  −1.462  −2.304  −1.020  −0.630  −1.772 0.070  −0.980 
 Los Angeles  −1.275  −1.201  −1.148  −0.653  −0.996  −1.583  −0.789     —  −0.738 
 NY (urban)  −0.693  −1.245  −0.558  −1.830  −1.017  −0.203 0.080  −4.190  −0.447 
 NY (suburban)  −1.011  −0.985  −0.661  −1.461  −1.054  −1.238  −1.425  −0.226  −0.936 
 Philadelphia  −0.621  −0.960  −0.290  −1.180  −0.893  −0.923  −0.801  −0.495  −0.490 
 Phoenix  −1.084  −0.846  −0.778  −0.859  −1.000  −0.469  −0.712  −0.853     — 
 San Antonio  −0.863  −1.041  −0.840  −1.184  −0.835  −0.607  −2.305  −1.471  −0.888 
 San Francisco  −1.158  −0.755  −1.199  −0.193  −0.845  −0.411  −0.994     —     — 
 
  Table 3 presents the virtual prices, which force consumption of new brands to zero, from 
the elasticity approach noted above. This approach involved the use of estimated elasticities 
to project virtual prices. For instance, if the own-price elasticity of demand for a new brand is 
2, then increasing prices by 50% will force its quantity demanded to zero. Although virtual 
price estimates from the Hausman and Leonard (2002) approach mostly yielded reasonable 88   April 2011  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
Table 3. Virtual Prices for New Brands (average) 
   New Brands 
























































































































































Notes: The virtual prices reported in this table are obtained using the elasticity method. For example, in Atlanta the observed 
price per ounce for New Brand I was 18 cents. The virtual price of New Brand I, which would set its demand at 0, was 
estimated to be 38.3 and 29.5 cents per ounce after and before introduction, respectively. 
 
estimates, about 20% were not plausible. For example, average virtual prices before and after 
introduction of top new brand II in Chicago were 300 to 400 times average post-introduction 
prices (0.262).
13 In comparison, the elasticity approach yielded average virtual prices of 0.517 
and 0.410 in pre- and post-introduction periods, respectively. With the elasticity approach, we 
encountered only a dozen virtual prices that were about three times the corresponding 
observed price in the post-introduction period (e.g., urban New York new brand I, suburban 
New York new brand III). Given the large variances of virtual prices from the Hausman and 
Leonard approach, we chose the elasticity-based approach for our welfare analysis. Still, we 
acknowledge the elasticity approach is limited in that demand slopes do not change when 
quantity demanded approaches the price axis. Fortunately, our price and demand experience 
for new brands is not that far from the price axis (market share data for new brands, table 1).
                                                 
13 Virtual price estimates from the Hausman and Leonard (2002) approach are available from the authors on request. Arnade, Gopinath, and Pick  Do Consumers Benefit from New Brand Introductions?   89 
 
Table 4. Observed and Estimated Expenditure in Pre- and Post-Introduction Periods 




  No. of 
  House-
   holds 
Observed 
Post-Introduction 
1 (,, ,) bn E U PPr  
Post-Introduction 
w/Virtual Prices 
11 * (,() , ,) n bb E U PPP r  
Pre-Introduction 
w/Virtual Prices 
*0 0 (,() , ,) n bb E U PPP r  
Atlanta, a = 0.00 
Atlanta, a = 0.25 
Atlanta, a = 0.50 






Boston, a = 0.00 
Boston, a = 0.25 
Boston, a = 0.50 






Chicago, a = 0.00 
Chicago, a = 0.25 
Chicago, a = 0.50 






Los Angeles, a = 0.00 
Los Angeles, a = 0.25 
Los Angeles, a = 0.50 






New York (urban), a = 0.00 
New York (urban), a = 0.25 
New York (urban), a = 0.50 






New York (suburban), a = 0.00 
New York (suburban), a = 0.25 
New York (suburban), a = 0.50 






Philadelphia, a = 0.00 
Philadelphia, a = 0.25 
Philadelphia, a = 0.50 






Phoenix, a = 0.00 
Phoenix, a = 0.25 
Phoenix, a = 0.50 






San Antonio, a = 0.00 
San Antonio, a = 0.25 
San Antonio, a = 0.50 






San Francisco, a = 0.00 
San Francisco, a = 0.25 
San Francisco, a = 0.50 






Notes: Expenditures are dollars spent by all sampled households in a city on a weekly basis. For example, in the 736 households 
in Atlanta, we observed total average expenditure on potato chips to be $469.39 a week (column 3). Using virtual prices, the 
estimated average expenditure would be $477.68 after introduction (column 4) and $483.36 before introduction (column 5), 
when a = 0. Parameter a indicates preference for variety; higher values of a indicate higher preference. 
 
  Table 4 presents the three expenditures required to compute the compensating variation in 
equation (2): observed expenditures in the post-introduction period, estimated expenditures in 
the post-introduction period with virtual prices, and estimated expenditures in the pre-intro-
duction period with virtual prices. The last two columns of table 4 present the expenditures 
with virtual prices in three alternative ways—setting the love-of-variety parameter a to 0.00, 
0.25, and 0.50. The variety effect (−VE) is expected to be positive since consumers prefer 
more to fewer varieties; i.e.,
11 * (, () , ,) bnb E U PPP r >
1 (, , ,) . bn E U PPr
 However, the price effect 
(−PE) can be either negative or positive depending on the nature of competition. A positive 
(negative) price effect would imply that the prices of existing brands are reduced (increased) 
following new brand introductions. Nevertheless, whether the variety effect is larger than the 
price effect, or vice versa, is an empirical question.   90   April 2011  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
  In table 4, we first compare
11 * (, () , ,) bnb E U PPP r  to
  1 (,, ,) , bn E U PPr which show the esti-
mated expenditure with virtual prices and observed expenditures, respectively, in the post-
introduction period. An interesting feature emerges when comparing these expenditures under 
alternative values of the love-of-variety parameter. With no preference for varieties (a = 0), 
most cities show negative variety effects as expected; i.e., when consumers do not value 
variety in consumption, an additional variety does not add to consumer surplus. However, 
even a small preference for variety (a = 0.25) creates positive variety effects in nine out of ten 
cities (Boston is the exception).
14 As noted earlier, previous studies estimated a to be in the 
neighborhood of 0.4, but in this case variety effects are positive for most cities even when a is 
set to 0.15 (Ardelean and Lugovskyy, 2010; Ardelean, 2009). As long as consumers show 
some variety preference, our findings reveal that new brand introductions create a positive 
variety effect (Hausman and Leonard, 2002; Pofahl and Richards, 2009). 
 Similarly,  we  compare
11 * (, () , ,) bnb E U PPP r and
00 * (, () , ,) bnb E U PPP r to evaluate price effects 
of new brand introductions in the 10 cities under alternative values for a. Results show that 
consumer expenditures have increased following brand introductions, when evaluated using 
respective virtual prices
11 * (( , ( ) ,, ) bnb E U PPP r >
00 * (, () , ,) ) , bnb EU PPP r
 except in Atlanta and Los 
Angeles for all values of a, and in Boston, urban New York, and Philadelphia for a = 0.5. 
Specifically, the price effect (−PE) is negative in 21 of 30 instances, suggesting consumer 
welfare declined with brand introductions because of the associated increase in the price of 
existing brands. For our preferred value of a (i.e., 0.25), we find that price effects are negative 
in eight of the ten cities (Atlanta and Los Angeles are exceptions). Note again that the sign of 
the net effect of new brand introductions on consumer welfare depends on whether or not 
positive variety effects offset the negative price effects in our application to potato chips. 
  Table 5 shows the variety effect, price effect, and total effect for all households per week 
and per household per year when a = 0.25. Variety effects are positive under both methods of 
measuring total effects in nine cities, with Boston the single exception. Positive variety 
effects in table 5 range from $6.43 (Phoenix) to $67.99 (Atlanta) per week for all households. 
As a percentage of expenditures, weekly welfare gains range from 8.03% (Philadelphia) to 
33.45% (urban New York) for all sampled households. On an annual basis, households’ 
welfare gain from new varieties is equivalent to a reduction in expenditures in the range of 
$3.13 (Los Angeles) to $28.14 (urban New York). Welfare loss in Boston is estimated to be 
$2.69 per household on an annual basis. 
  Price effects are mostly negative except in the cases of Atlanta and Los Angeles. The 
negative price effects range from $4.78 (Boston) to $52.37 (Philadelphia) per week for all 
households. Weekly welfare losses range from 6.14% (San Antonio) to 20.53% (urban New 
York) for all sampled households. On an annual basis, households’ welfare loss from price 
increases associated with new brand introduction is equivalent to an increase in expenditures 
in the range of $2.67 (San Francisco) to $17.29 (urban New York). Welfare gains from 
positive price effects of $0.23 and $7.02 per household per year are observed in Los Angeles 
and Atlanta. The predominantly negative price effects point to producers’ welfare gain from 
new brand introductions. However, we exercise caution in referring to these as producers’ 
welfare gain because relative prices change over time. The differential rate of change in cost 
of living (inflation) across U.S. cities suggests lower producer gains than those reported in 
table 5 as price effects.   
                                                 
14 Due to sample size (48 households) and strong complementarity among new as well as existing brands, there is little variation 
in Boston’s expenditures when the value of a, the variety-preference parameter, is altered. Arnade, Gopinath, and Pick  Do Consumers Benefit from New Brand Introductions?   91 
 
Table 5. Price, Variety, and Total Effects from New Brand Introductions (a = 0.25) 





























Boston  −0.93 
(−2.68) 
−2.69  −4.78 
(−14.63) 

















NY (urban)  50.88 
(33.45) 





NY (suburban)  21.95 
(12.07) 
9.67  −33.42 
(−18.38) 





7.81  −52.37 
(−10.17) 





4.71  −6.65 
(−11.47) 
−4.37  −0.22 
(−0.40) 
−0.16 
San Antonio  44.28 
(11.94) 





San Francisco  54.70 
(14.79) 





Notes: Values in parentheses represent percentage of expenditures. Variety, price, and total effects are measured in dollars 
(expenditure change). For example, in Chicago the welfare gain from variety effect amounted to $62.58 per week (column 1) or 
$6.44 per year (column 2) per household. Price effects amounted to −$44.30 per week (column 3) or −$4.56 per year (column 4) 
per household. Total welfare gain was $18.25 per week (column 5) or $1.88 per year (column 6) per household. 
 
  The sum of positive variety and negative price effects ranges from −$11.48 (suburban New 
York) to $105.39 (Atlanta) for all households per week. Four cities with a negative total 
effect are Boston, suburban New York, Philadelphia, and Phoenix. Note that the total effect 
for Phoenix is close to zero, while the remaining three cities show welfare gains from new 
brand introductions. As a percentage of expenditures, weekly welfare gains range from 4.20% 
(Chicago) to 22.45% (Atlanta) for all sampled households.
15 However, welfare losses per 
week for all sampled households range from 0.40% to 17.05% of expenditures in Boston, 
suburban New York, Philadelphia, and Phoenix. Other than Phoenix, the three cities with a 
significant net welfare loss are in the Northeast, where entry barriers may be high enough to 
allow current producers and/or retailers to increase the price of existing brands. 
  In general, the results suggest that consumer welfare improves following new brand 
introduction. The varying price and variety effects demonstrate alternative competitive forces 
shaping regional markets. However, some price increases associated with additional brand 
choices suggest firms’ use of multiple strategies, including brand-based competition targeted 
at specific regional markets. Geographic persistence of top brands is likely associated with 
brands’ city of origin (Bronnenberg, Dhar, and Dube, 2009); that is, markets farther from the 
                                                 
15 Welfare gains and losses can be projected for the entire city. For example, the net welfare gain of $1.88 per household per year 
in Chicago translates into $1.13 million annual expenditure savings (about 600,000 consuming households). 92   April 2011  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
 
 
brand’s city of origin tend to have a lower share of it. Thus, measuring consumer welfare 
at the regional rather than the national level offers sharper insights into the nature of com-
petition. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
We have applied a compensating-variation approach to measure changes in consumer welfare 
as a result of new brand introductions in the potato chip market. For this purpose, we estimated 
an AIDS model and evaluated consumer expenditure before and after a new brand introduction. 
The resulting measure of compensating variation (expenditure change) identified the total 
benefit to consumers, which was further separated into variety and price effects. The variety 
effect of new brand introduction is generally assumed to be positive, indicating consumers 
prefer more to fewer varieties. However, the price effect can be either negative or positive 
depending on the nature of competition. A positive (negative) price effect would imply that 
the prices of existing brands are reduced (increased) following new brand introductions. 
  The relatively recent introduction of baked, organic, and flavored potato chips has altered 
the nature of competition in the potato chip market. The ACNielsen Homescan database was 
used to track potato chip purchases in nearly 7,000 U.S. households between 1998 and 2006. 
Household data on chip price and quantity purchased by brands or varieties were aggregated 
to weekly data for 10 major U.S. cities for this analysis. 
  We estimated brand demand functions, underlying an expenditure function, with pre- and 
post-introduction data. Consumer expenditures were evaluated in three forms based on the 
brand demand function estimates: (a) using observed post-introduction period prices for exist-
ing and new brands, (b) using post-introduction period prices for existing brands and virtual 
prices for new brands, and (c) using pre-introduction period prices for existing brands and 
virtual prices for new brands. The virtual or inferred price of the new brand prior to introduc-
tion was defined as a price high enough to ensure zero demand for the new brand. Similarly, 
the virtual price in the post-introduction period is the price that forced consumption of a new 
brand to zero. Virtual prices were computed in two alternative ways: Hausman and Leonard’s 
(2002) method and an elasticity approach. The latter approach yielded the least price variance. 
  Results indicate that variety effects are positive in nine of the ten cities when consumers 
exhibit a preference for variety, and these welfare gains ranged from 8.03% to 33.45% of 
expenditures per household. The mostly negative price effects ranged from 6.14% to 20.53% 
of expenditures per household, pointing to producers’ welfare gain from new brand intro-
ductions. The sum of positive variety and negative price effects is positive for six of the ten 
cities. Significant net welfare losses in northeastern cities suggest the presence of high entry 
barriers. The varying total effects by city demonstrate alternative competitive forces shaping 
regional markets. Thus, national policies guarding against anti-competitive behavior may have 
different outcomes depending on the region’s characteristics. 
  In general, the results suggest that consumer welfare improves following brand intro-
ductions. Our results also show that prices of existing brands increase following such 
introductions. The latter result is likely explained by firms’ use of joint price- and brand-
based strategies to compete against one another and new entrants. Future analysis may focus 
on the interaction between firms’ brand introduction strategies and pricing rules to better 
understand the nature of competition and the resulting consumer welfare in a market. 
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